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Introduction
Malawi is a predominantly agrarian economy. With around 85 percent of the 
country’s population relying on agriculture for their livelihoods, it is estimated 
that the sector makes up as much as 35 percent of GDP, 80 percent of export 
earnings, and 70 percent of total rural income. Underpinning both Malawi’s 
industrial and manufacturing sectors, agriculture is integral to any concerted 
effort aimed at achieving inclusive growth, and therefore lies at the heart of 
Malawi’s political economy.
This brief, which is based on a longer paper1, examines the evolution and political 
economy of agricultural commercialisation in Malawi since the 1960s, from both a 
historical and a contemporary perspective. 
After Independence: Malawi under MCP
The Malawi Congress Party (MCP) governed Malawi between July 1964 and May 
1994 under the leadership of Dr Kamuzu Banda. After independence, Malawi was 
one of the poorest countries on the continent, without a viable productive base to 
spearhead its socio-economic development aspirations.
Without any viable alternative to drive its development agenda, the political elite 
turned to agriculture. In fact, one of the key priorities was to reform the colonial land 
tenure, in order to create an environment that would facilitate equitable agricultural 
development among Malawians. But instead of addressing the inequities and 
injustices of the colonial era, the postcolonial land policies and practices anchored 
by the 1967 Land Act simply reinforced them. And, while the land remained 
substantively customary, the 1967 land reforms facilitated the creation of a land 
market that allowed for only one-way transferability of land – from the customary to 
the estate sector, usually with only token compensation.
Furthermore, the 1965–1969 Development Plan designated estate export-oriented 
agriculture as the surest strategy for achieving rapid and sustainable socio-
1 Chinsinga, B. (2018) The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation in Malawi, APRA  
 Working Paper 17, Future Agricultures Consortium
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economic transformation. The commercialisation of smallholder 
agriculture, which had been prioritised in the previous Development 
Plan, was abandoned. Access to estate agriculture provided a 
legitimate means of accumulation among the elites supported 
by a carefully worked out policy milieu. For instance, while those 
engaged in estate farming were at liberty to cultivate a variety of 
crops without limit, those within the smallholder sector were legally 
prohibited from producing such cash crops as burley tobacco, tea 
and sugar as a result of the 1972 Special Crops Act.
Smallholder agricultural commercialisation was condemned as 
unable to generate economic growth, provide for food security, and 
provide sufficient revenues for essential development investment. 
President Banda argued that smallholder farmers could not make 
serious investment in commercial agriculture because of the 
dominance of the customary land ownership pattern. Furthermore, 
smallholder farmers lacked the expertise and skills to manage 
commercial agriculture on a scale sufficient to facilitate the country’s 
socio-economic transformation.
The emphasis on an estate export-oriented agricultural strategy 
was further reinforced in the 1971–1980 and 1986–1996 Statement 
of Development Policies. Government policy facilitated the rapid 
expansion of estate agriculture through: acquisition of customary 
land; implicit taxation of smallholder agriculture through the 
smallholder pricing policy; and control of the commercial banks 
and Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC). Through this institutional framework, President Banda’s 
one-party regime developed policies that could be used to buy off 
potential opposition elements, and prop up and consolidate his 
political power.
Multi-party democracy
Following relentless donor and domestic political pressure, in 
response to the MCP’s repressive regime, multi-party democracy 
was reinstated in May 1994 with the United Democratic Front 
(UDF) government. This democratic transition was associated with 
a dramatic change in the configuration of the political elite. While 
the one-party political elites were predominantly agriculture-
oriented, the elites that replaced them in 1994 were primarily 
interested in business as their primary source of accumulation. 
These changes led to a decline in estate agriculture and the rise 
of subsidies to deal with food insecurity, caused by a combination 
of natural causes and the devastating impacts of structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs).
The transition to a democracy opened considerable space for 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and independent media – this 
in addition to the state-controlled broadcasters, who were the 
only source of information during the one-party era. The political 
liberalisation further created space for donor influence in the 
policymaking processes. However, the opening up of the political 
space to CSOs has not greatly altered the key underlying features 
of the country’s political settlement. CSOs that are determined to 
engage the government in constructive policy dialogue and debate 
are frustrated by the enduring culture of bureaucratic secrecy. 
This is further exacerbated by the fact that the government has 
developed the reputation of dealing almost exclusively with friendly, 
predictable civil society groups.
The absence of functioning local governments in Malawi also meant 
that political decisions could not be meaningfully made by the 
majority, thereby limiting the participation of ordinary Malawians in 
the democratic governance and development processes. When the 
tenure of local governments constituted in November 2000 expired 
in May 2005, the local government elections were continuously 
postponed until the May 2014 tripartite elections, which meant 
that, for nine consecutive years, the country was governed without 
democratically elected local governments.
However, the apparent failure to institutionalise local government 
has not greatly affected the implementation of the agricultural 
commercialisation agenda. Neither is this failure driven by any 
agricultural considerations or indeed land issues, which lie at the 
heart of the country’s agricultural political economy.
Different phases of agricultural 
commercialisation
Since independence, three phases of agricultural commercialisation 
can be identified: (1) the estate–smallholder agriculture phase 
(1964–1994); (2) the failed smallholder commercialisation phase 
(1994–2009); and (3) the large-scale agriculture promotion phase 
(2009–present). These phases are not entirely distinct, but are 
distinguishable from each other through the relative significance 
of politics in implementing a set of distinctive ideas about 
commercialisation. (Note: estate and large-scale agriculture are 
essentially the same in structure and functioning; the difference lies 
in a change in usage over time, with ‘large-scale’ generally being the 
accepted contemporary usage.)
Estate agriculture (1964-1994)
As already stated, government policy under MCP facilitated the 
rapid expansion of estate agriculture. The dominance of Malawian 
ownership of estates within the 5–100 ha category can be attributed 
to the developments that took place in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
when the government simplified the processes of leasing land and 
lowered the threshold for the size of an estate.
The implementation of the estate export-oriented agricultural 
development strategy produced clear winners and losers. While 
President Banda and his elites were winners, as the strategy 
allowed him to accumulate massive wealth and consolidate his 
political power, and allowed loyal elites to accumulate wealth, 
the smallholder farmers were big losers even though support 
was directed to them, to guarantee self-reliance in the context of 
a growing population and urbanisation. Major investments were 
© Credit Swathi Sridharan and ICRISAT
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actually made in marketing and storage infrastructure in customary 
land, but these efforts were undermined by the high maize prices 
that heavily damaged the welfare of people living in poverty. They 
could not enjoy the benefits of their investment in agriculture, nor 
the full extent of the support provided, as they were not allowed 
to grow certain crops and could only sell their produce through 
ADMARC at predatory prices. National self-sufficiency in maize was 
very much a political strategy to ensure that smallholders continued 
producing low revenue-generating crops, while elites continued 
dominating the high revenue-generating export sector, largely 
through burley tobacco.
Estate agriculture continued to be an important driver of agricultural 
commercialisation but was somewhat tempered by the IMF and 
World Bank’s demand for the Malawi government to embrace 
SAPs as a means to revitalise the agricultural sector and kick-start 
smallholder-driven agricultural commercialisation. However, 
Dr Banda resisted the liberalisation of the agricultural sector, 
particularly in relation to maize marketing, given its salient position 
in Malawi’s overall commitment to the national food self-sufficiency 
position. But, as a result, the country suffered tremendous 
productivity losses.
Failed smallholder commercialisation phase (1994-2009)
As an integral part of the World Bank’s effort to promote 
smallholder-driven agricultural commercialisation as a viable rural 
development strategy, the 1990 Agricultural Sector Credit included 
a policy proposal to open up the cultivation of burley tobacco to 
smallholder farmers.
The World Bank’s position was rooted in the theory that the 
liberalisation of high-value cash crops among smallholder farmers 
accelerates agricultural commercialisation and fosters rural 
development. Cash crop liberalisation thus allows households to 
increase their incomes by producing that which provides the highest 
return to their productive resources, and they use the cash to buy 
consumption goods. 
However, the liberalisation of tobacco cultivation, coupled with the 
removal of fertiliser and seed subsidies, promoted the displacement 
of maize by tobacco, which culminated in chronic food insecurity. 
Tobacco liberalisation further failed to live up to its promise as the 
engine of growth for the rural economy because of worsening land 
ownership patterns. The annexation of land from the customary to 
the estate sector under the auspices of the 1967 Land Act left the 
majority of smallholder farmers with very small landholdings, which 
limited the adoption of burley cultivation, and was exacerbated by 
rapid population increase. 
Excessive land fragmentation also had significant implications for 
the adoption of new agricultural technology. So while smallholder 
farmers now produce more than three-quarters of Malawi’s 
burley tobacco, the income from burley tobacco did not allow 
smallholder farmers to invest in seed and fertiliser technology 
to boost food security, and because of the collapse of tobacco 
prices, the anticipated multiplier effects from the liberalisation of 
the cultivation of burley tobacco (such as increased demand for 
farm labour, rural goods and services) were realised only to a very 
limited extent. 
Falling tobacco prices, displacement of maize by tobacco, 
inefficient combination of maize and tobacco and the removal of 
input subsidies combined to create and entrench structural food 
insecurity. This led the government to reinstate subsidies, initially 
through the Starter Pack (SP) and Targeted Input Programme (TIP). 
The SP provided small packs of maize seed and fertilizer: a 2.5 kg bag 
of hybrid seed and bags of the recommended quantity and type of 
fertiliser, as well as a 1–2 kg bag of complementary nitrogen-fixing 
legume. It was estimated that this input package given to all 1.8 
million smallholder farmers would generate an extra 10 kg of maize 
on a 0.1 ha of fertilised hybrid maize.
Donor engagement with the government on the cost-effectiveness 
of the SP led to its graduation into the Targeted Input Programme 
(TIP) from the 2001/02 growing season with the substitution of 
hybrid with Open Pollinated Variety (OPV) maize. The justification 
was that farmers would be able to recycle OPV seed for three 
consecutive growing seasons without losing the yield vigour.
The government’s position, articulated in the Malawi Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper, resonated very well with the Green 
Revolution route to progressively achieve smallholder agricultural 
commercialisation, as growth in smallholder farmer incomes 
would be achieved by increasing maize productivity.  However, 
the political elites strategically resisted the liberalisation of the 
marketing of maize and, through the subsidies, the government was 
able to appease the masses by guaranteeing the availability and 
affordability of maize. 
Large-scale agriculture promotion phase (2009-present)
Fertiliser Input Subsidy Programme (FISP)
Since 2005, there has been a progressive increase in the financial 
allocation to the agricultural sector following the implementation 
of the FISP. This is line with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) of allocating at least 10 percent 
of the annual budget to the agricultural sector in order to achieve 
the minimum annual growth rate of 6 percent so as to positively 
impact poverty reduction efforts). The FISP is essentially the same 
as the SP, but provides farmers with a larger quantity of inputs: two 
50 kg portions of fertiliser, 5 kg of hybrid maize seed and 2 kg of 
legume seed.
However, while the FISP has been quite critical in dealing with 
Malawi’s food security crisis, it has been at the centre of rent-
seeking and patronage activities, which has been manifested 
through the award of contracts for the procurement and 
transportation of inputs. Political elites have also exploited 
donor approaches that are often characterised by short-termism, 
competitiveness, and personality politics. 
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Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (MEGs)
The initial design of the FISP mirrored the underlying intent of 
the MEGS, which espoused the return to large-scale agriculture 
as the only feasible way to spearhead sustainable agricultural 
commercialisation.
The emphasis on large-scale agriculture in the MEGS led to a 
detailed analysis of the performance constraints and strategies of 
the tobacco, tea and sugar sectors as a first step towards revitalising 
agricultural productivity in the country. It also proposed venturing 
into export production beyond the traditional crops to include 
cotton, cassava, pigeon peas, groundnuts, beans, rice, dairy 
products and soya.
All of Malawi’s major policy documents since the MEGS have 
consistently emphasised large-scale agriculture as a practical, 
viable pathway for agricultural commercialisation through contract 
farming or out-grower schemes, targeting both traditional and 
non-traditional export commodities. This included the Green 
Belt Initiative (GBI) (2010), which emphasised the promotion and 
enhancement of agricultural commercialisation through contract 
farming and out-grower schemes and improved cooperation 
between value chain stakeholders. However, the success of the 
GBI to increase wealth creation through increased agricultural 
production and productivity, enterprise development and increased 
exports is dependent on the availability of land and water.
Rhetoric versus implementation
However, there has been a considerable mismatch between the 
government’s articulation of its vision of large-scale agriculture as a 
primary driver of agricultural commercialisation and development, 
and its actual implementation. This can be attributed to two main 
factors: (1) the preoccupation with the struggle to achieve national 
and household food security through the implementation of the 
FISP; and, (2) resistance to land deals that would have facilitated the 
acquisition of land for large-scale agricultural investments under the 
GBI and the G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. 
Despite government policy documents consistently projecting 
large-scale agriculture as the primary lever for agricultural 
commercialisation since the launch of the MEGS, the main focus 
has remained on ensuring that the country has enough food 
to feed itself, through the FISP. This has been reinforced by the 
recent unfavourable climatic patterns that have undermined the 
robustness of the FISP as a food security-enhancement tool. In fact, 
there has been considerable debate about whether to continue with 
the programme, with many describing it as a fiscal drain given the 
host of rent-seeking activities that surround it.
During this phase with the government’s emphasis on large-
scale agriculture, which requires that land be made available for 
investment by private sector actors, smallholder farmers have 
been the main losers. Land reforms since the 1967 Land Act, which 
have been completed to facilitate the acquisition of land within 
a legitimate legislative and institutional framework, have further 
marginalised smallholder farmers in terms of land ownership since 
they principally target farm land.
The smallholder farmers are also losers because they are being 
subjected to ‘land grabs’ by their own urban-based compatriots, 
who are turning these tracts of land into medium-sized commercial 
farms. Since these ‘weekend farmers’ are invading rural areas at a 
rapid rate, the next generation of smallholder farmers, whose land 
has been grabbed, is being consigned to a livelihood of poverty 
since land remains the only worthwhile asset for the majority of 
people in rural areas.
Land and food security in agricultural commercialisation
Whilst land reforms have been implemented with the idea of 
promoting and facilitating agricultural commercialisation, they have 
not been very successful. The latest land reforms under the new 
Customary Land Act make provision for customary land owners to 
register their land and own it as private property. The underlying 
intention of the land reforms is to transform the entire country into a 
planning area, but the adoption of this new legislative framework is 
illustrative of the contestations that make it difficult for the country 
to implement agricultural commercialisation.
All major strategies – such as the MGDS I and II, the GBI, the 
National Export Strategy (NES) and the Malawi Economic Recovery 
Plan (MERP) – tout large-scale agriculture as the surest way for 
Malawi to achieve agricultural commercialisation, but these have 
been ineffectively implemented due to the unending contestations 
about land.
Conclusions
 ● Agriculture remains central to the country’s political 
economy since Malawi is a predominantly agrarian economy
 ● Although there have been changes in the configuration 
of political elites with respect to direct stakes in the 
sector, agriculture remains the centre of corruption and 
rent-seeking activities that shape the country’s political 
settlement.
 ● Achieving food security – either by making maize available 
at affordable prices through the market or subsidising 
production – remains the top priority for successive 
governments.
 ● Electoral considerations play a critical role in shaping the 
debates about agricultural commercialisation in Malawi, 
particularly in terms of actions that are actually taken at 
practical level.
 ● These actions are taken in the context of the unresolved 
land question, which makes it challenging to implement 
initiatives directed at spearheading agricultural 
commercialisation. 
© Credit Ollivier Girard and EIF
5APRA BRIEF 13 - The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation in Malawi
Image captions:
Cover – Woman maize farmer in Malawi
Page 2 – Groundnut harvesting at Chitedze Agricultural Research Station, Malawi
Page 3 – Bester Glandson was lent land and taught to grow groundnuts through the National Smallholder Farmers’ Association of Malawi
Page 4 – Malawian farmer Bester Glandson displays her produce
APRA is funded with UK aid from the UK government and will run from 2016-2021. 
The programme is based at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), UK (www.ids.ac.uk), with regional hubs at the Centre for
African Bio-Entrepreneurship (CABE), Kenya, the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), South Africa, and the
University of Ghana, Legon. It builds on more than a decade of research and policy engagement work by the Future Agricultures
Consortium (www.future-agricultures.org) and involves new partners at Lund University, Sweden, and Michigan State University
and Tufts University, USA.
Funded by
Chinsinga, B. (2019) The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation in Malawi, APRA Brief 13, Future Agricultures Consortium
© APRA 2018
ISBN: 78-1-78118-503-2
This is an Open Access report distributed under the terms of the Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivs 3.0 Unported (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0) 
Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any 
reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use. NonCommercial — You may not use the material 
for commercial purposes. NoDerivatives — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material. 
You are free to: Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode
If you use the work, we ask that you reference the APRA website (www.future-agricultures.org/ apra/) and send a copy of the work or a link to 
its use online to the following address for our archive: APRA, Rural Futures, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK (apra@ids.ac.uk)
